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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Constitution is a social, as well as legal, document 
and should be interpreted and applied as such.  Context is crucial in 
constitutional interpretations.  The law cannot and should not exist in a 
vacuum.  When interpreting the Constitution, the lasting and pervasive 
impact of structural and institutional racism and the undercurrents of 
white privilege should not be ignored. In other words, when interpreting 
the Constitution, the civil rights of non-white society members must be 
acknowledged and addressed. Purely literal interpretations of law must
give way to both legal—precedential—and societal contexts and, in 
particular, racial equity in the context of equal protection.
Brown v. Board of Education, decided by the United States Supreme 
Court in 1954, is a seminal case from 20th century jurisprudence because 
the Court used context to reach its landmark decision.1  The Court looked 
to the realities of segregation by boldly recognizing, acknowledging, and 
responding to inequality and racial injustice— instead of turning a blind 
eye to it.  In recent decisions, however, the Supreme Court, particularly 
Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, has distanced itself from 
Brown’s contextual approach, instead retreating into “intentional blindness”2 
and “post-racial determinism”3 that interprets the Constitution in an
intellectual vacuum rooted in doctrinal and societal stereotypes decrying 
affirmative action.4  In the wake of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 
there is much concern over the lifespan of the educational benefits of
diversity as a compelling government interest.  This article argues: (1) 
achieving racial equity, not the educational benefits of diversity, is a 
compelling government interest; (2) holistic diversity review policies in 
admissions decisions is a method to achieve said interest; and (3) the 
educational benefits of a diverse student body are merely a positive outcome 
of striving to attain racial equity.
Diversity of thought and experience is informed by the various
attributes that make up an individual and that individual’s perspectives, 
including those attributes informed by the individual’s race or ethnicity. 
As such, considering race and ethnicity in a holistic review process is a 
1. 	  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2. 	Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1779 (2012). 
3. Cedric Merlin Powell, Justice Thomas, Brown, and Post-Racial Determinism, 
53 WASHBURN L.J. 451, 452 (2014). 
4. 	See id. at 453–54. 
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narrowly tailored balance between the realities of this nation’s racial
inequities, segregated and discriminatory past, racial tension—past and
present—and equal protection. In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,5 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion articulated the necessity
of context when analyzing equal protection and public school admission 
policies: “government actors, including [institutions of public education], 
need not be blind to the lingering effects of ‘an overtly discriminatory past,’
the legacy of ‘centuries of law-sanctioned inequality.’”6  Likewise, government 
actors, including the Supreme Court, need not be blind to the lingering 
and pervasive effects of the racial inequities caused by this nation’s
“overtly discriminatory past:”7 the legacy of centuries of law-sanctioned 
inequality. In other words, when the government ignores racial inequity,
equal protection is not equal, nor are its principles achieved. 
This Article reframes the analysis by viewing educational diversity 
through the lens of racial justice, specifically racial inequities in public
institutions.  It argues that until racial equity is the structural, institutional, 
and societal norm in America, achieving racial equity through educational
diversity must remain a compelling government interest.  Part II defines 
and provides examples of structural and institutional racism and white 
privilege. Part III outlines the use of context in the Brown decision. Part
IV discusses the admissions policy in Fisher; analyzes the concurrences 
of Justices Thomas and Scalia, and challenges the contention that the “use 
of race in higher education admissions [policies and] decisions is 
categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.”8  Part V further 
deconstructs the concurring opinions in Fisher and argues the use of race,
when framed by the necessity of racial equity, is a compelling government
interest and does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
II. REFRAMING THE CONVERSATION: RACIAL EQUITY, STRUCTURAL 
AND INSTITUTIONAL RACISM, AND WHITE PRIVILEGE 
An inquiry into racial equity, structural racism, institutional racism, and 
white privilege is required to understand the necessity of context in 
5. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2433 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting).
 6. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003)). 
7. Id.
 8. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 915 
KIEL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/18/2015 9:53 AM 
 









    
 
 
   
 





   
  
 
constitutional decisions.  Racial equity—or a genuinely non-racist society— 
should be the ideal our nation strives to attain; a society where the distribution 
of benefits and burdens are not skewed by race or because of a person’s 
race.
In other words, racial equity would be a reality in which a person is no more or 
less likely to experience society’s benefits or burdens just because of the color of 
their skin. . . . Racial equity holds society to a higher standard.  It demands that 
we pay attention not just to individual-level discrimination, but to overall social 
outcomes.9 
However, until racial equity is attained, consideration of race remains 
necessary. 
A. Structural Racism 
Structural racism,10 sometimes referred to as systemic racism, is a
system that perpetuates racial injustice in various, often reinforcing ways, 
such as through its public policies, institutional practices, cultural
representations, national values, and other societal norms.11  The Structural 
Racism Glossary defines cultural representations as: 
[P]opular stereotypes, images, frames and narratives that are socialized and reinforced
by media, language and other forms of mass communication and “common sense.” 
Cultural representations can be positive or negative, but from the perspective of
the dismantling structural racism analysis, too often cultural representations
depict people of color in ways that are dehumanizing, perpetuate inaccurate 
stereotypes, and have the overall effect of allowing unfair treatment within the society
as a whole to seem fair, or “natural.”12 
It defines national values as: 
[B]ehaviors and characteristics that we as members of a society are taught to
value and enact. Fairness, equal treatment, individual responsibility, and
meritocracy are examples of some key national values in the United States.  When
looking at national values through a structural racism lens, however, we can see 
that there are certain values that have allowed structural racism to exist in ways 
that are hard to detect.  This is because these national values are referred to in 
ways that ignore historical realities.  Two examples of such national values are 
‘personal responsibility’ and ‘individualism,’ which convey the idea that people 
9. Glossary for Understanding the Dismantling Structural Racism/Promoting 
Equity Analysis, ASPEN INST. (last visited Oct. 15, 2015) [hereinafter Structural Racism 
Glossary], http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/rcc/RCC-Structural­
Racism-Glossary.pdf [http://perma.cc/DAF7-8FX3].
10. Keith Lawrence & Terry Keleher, Address at Race & Public Policy Conference:
Structural Racism (2004), http://www.intergroupresources.com/rc/Definitions%20of%20Racism. 
pdf [http://perma.cc/G2Z4-7AF6]. 
11.  Structural Racism Glossary, supra note 9.
 12. Id. 
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control their fates regardless of social position, and that individual behaviors and
choices alone determine material outcomes.13 
Structural Racism:
Lies underneath, all around and across society.  It encompasses: (1) history, 
which lies underneath the surface, providing the foundation for white supremacy
[and privilege] in this country.  (2) culture, which exists all around our everyday
lives, providing the normalization and replication of racism and, (3) interconnected 
institutions and policies, [the] key relationships and rules across society providing
the legitimacy and reinforcements to maintain and perpetuate racism.14 
Examples of structural racism include, “racist history, dominant cultural
representations, popular myths, and compounded and chronic [racial] 
inequities.”15  In the United States, it routinely advantages whites, while
producing cumulative and chronic adverse outcomes for people of color; 
it is a system of hierarchy and inequity, primarily categorized by white 
privilege and exacerbated by institutional racism.16 
B. Institutional Racism 
Institutional racism “occurs within and between institutions.”17 It “refers
to the policies and practices within and across institutions that, intentionally 
or not, produce outcomes that chronically favor, or put a [non-majority]
racial group at a disadvantage.”18  It encompasses “discriminatory treatment, 
unfair policies and inequitable opportunities or impacts based on race” in 
public institutions.19  Examples of institutional racism include:
1.	 Police officers treating individuals of color with racial bias— 
Baltimore, Ferguson, New York.20
 13. Id. 
14.  Lawrence & Keleher, supra note 10 (emphasis added). 
15. Id.
 16. Id.
 17. Id. (emphasis removed). 
18.  Structural Racism Glossary, supra note 9.
19.  Lawrence & Keleher, supra note 10. 
20. Jeff Nesbit, Institutional Racism Is Our Way of Life, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 
(May 6, 2015, 1:16 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/at-the-edge/2015/05/06/ 
institutional-racism-is-our-way-of-life [http://perma.cc/BK6R-XPXA]; see also Joshua 
Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: A Decade of Research on Racial Bias in the 
Decision To Shoot, 8 SOC. &  PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 201 (2014), http:// 
www.csun.edu/~dma/Correll,%20Hudson,%20Guillermo,%20&%20Ma%20(2014).pdf 
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2.	 Racial disparities in media representation of white versus black 
criminals and victims.21 
3.	 “In the workplace, black college graduates are twice as likely 
as whites to struggle to find jobs - the jobless rate for blacks has 
been double that of whites for decades.  A study even found that 
people with ‘black-sounding names’ [, all other things being equal,]
had to send out 50 percent more job applications than people
with ‘white-sounding names’ just to get a call back.”22 
4.	 Black men are three times more likely to be searched during traffic
stops, and six times more likely to go jail than a white person.23 
5.	 “Black people stay in prison longer than white people–up to 20 
percent longer than white people serving time for essentially 
similar crimes.”24 
6.	 “Black people receive harsher sentences–black people are 38
percent more likely to be sentenced to death than white people 
for the same crimes.”25 
7.	 The skin color of a victim matters greatly in the punishment for 
capital crimes.  “Whites and blacks represent about half of murder 
victims from year to year, but 77 percent of people who are executed
killed a white person, while only 13 percent of death row executions 
represent those who killed a black person.”26 
8.	 “About 73 percent of whites own homes, compared to just 43 
percent of blacks. The gap between median household incomes 
for whites (about $91,000) compared to blacks (about $7,000) 
is staggering, and that gap has tripled in just the past 25 years.
[http://perma.cc/TTK2-3SAH] (examining racial bias in the decision to shoot and 
identification of weapon and threats). 
21. Nick Wing, When the Media Treats White Suspects and Killers Better than
Black Victims, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 14, 2014, 8:59 AM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2014/08/14/media-black-victims_n_5673291.html [http://perma.cc/A9RP-DWUK]. 
22. Nesbit, supra note 20; see also  JANELLE JONES & JOHN SCHMITT, CTR. FOR
ECON. &  POLICY RESEARCH, A COLLEGE DEGREE IS NO GUARANTEE 2–4 (2014), 
http://www.cepr.net/documents/black-coll-grads-2014-05.pdf [http://perma.cc/7XNB­
DZTB] (reporting that the unemployment rate for black workers is much higher than it is
for other workers). 
23. Nesbit, supra note 20 (citing THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE
SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: REGARDING
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1, 5 (2013), 
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_ICCPR%20Race%20and%20Justice%2 
0Shadow%20Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/GRV2-YTZN]). 
24. Id. (citing THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 22, at 12). 
25. Id. (citing THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 22, at 14). 
26. Id. (citing THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 22, at 13). 
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The median net worth of white families is about $265,000,
while it was just $28,500 for blacks.”27 
Education-specific examples of institutional racism:
9.	 The application of school disciplinary policies punishes students 
of color at much higher rates than their white counterparts for 
the same infraction.28 
10. Across age groups, black students are three times more likely
than white students to be suspended.29 
11. Black children represent 18% of preschool enrollment, but 48%
of black preschool children receive more than one out-of­
school suspension; in comparison, white children represent 
43% of preschool enrollment but only 26% of white preschool
children receive more than one out-of-school suspension.30 
12. Black girls are suspended at higher rates—12%—than girls of
any other race or ethnicity and most boys; the suspension rate
for white boys is 6% and white girls is 2%.31 
13. Black students make up only 16% of student enrollment, but
they represent 27% of students referred to law enforcement and
31% of students subjected to a school-related arrest—almost 
double the percent of actual enrollment.  Compare this to white
students: they represent 51% of enrollment, 41% of students 
27. Id.; see also Rakesh Kochhar & Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened
Along Racial, Ethnic Lines Since End of Great Recession, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 12, 2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession [http:// 
perma.cc/GGW6-GUDS] (providing data on wealth disparity between different races);
Nine Charts About Wealth Inequality in America, URB. INST., http://datatools.urban.org/
Features/wealth-inequality-charts [http://perma.cc/3NUZ-7XFU] (last visited Oct. 15, 2015)
(providing more data on income and homeownership disparity between races).
 28. DANIEL J. LOSEN, NAT’L EDUC. POLICY CTR., DISCIPLINE POLICIES, SUCCESSFUL
SCHOOLS, AND RACIAL JUSTICE 4–8, (2011), http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/discipline­
policies [http://perma.cc/4AC7-JJZ2]; see also Nesbit, supra note 20 (“[B]lack children 
are three times more likely to be suspended than white children.”).
 29. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION: 
DATA SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 1–3 (2014), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/ 
docs/crdc-discipline-snapshot.pdf [https://perma.cc/F46D-HYE3]. 
30. Id. at 1. 
31. Id. at 3. 
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referred to law enforcement, and 39% of those arrested—all
percentages smaller than the percent of actual enrollment.32 
These racial disparities are glaring examples of institutional racism and
must be addressed, and stamped out if racial equity is ever to be achieved 
in this country. 
c. White Privilege 
White privilege refers to the advantages whites receive in access, both 
historical and contemporary, such as “to quality education, decent jobs
and livable wages, homeownership, retirement benefits[,]. . .wealth.”33 
For most white people, taking advantage of white privileges is not intentional 
or done with racial animus, but that does not negate the benefits received
from the privilege. White privilege is illuminated by the following quote:
As a white person I [was] taught about racism that puts others at a disadvantage, 
but [was not] taught . . . to see one of its corollary aspects, white privilege, which
puts me at an advantage  . . . White privilege is an invisible package of unearned 
assets which I can count on cashing in every day, but about which I was meant to
remain oblivious.34 
The following examples of white privilege may help readers better
understand white privilege.  Consider the impact each example would have
on you if the consideration were a part of your daily life: 
1.	 I can, if I wish, arrange to be in the company of people of 
my race most of the time.
2.	 I can avoid spending time with people whom I was trained 
to mistrust and who have learned to mistrust my kind or me. 
3.	 If I should need to move, I can be pretty sure of renting or
purchasing housing in an area, which I can afford and in which 
I would want to live.
4.	 I can be pretty sure that my neighbors in such a location will
be neutral or pleasant to me. 
5.	 I can go shopping alone most of the time, pretty well assured 
that I will not be followed or harassed.
 32. Id. at 1. 
33.  Structural Racism Glossary, supra note 9.
34. Structural Racism Glossary, supra note 9 (quoting Peggy McIntosh, White
Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming To See Correspondences
Through Work in Women’s Studies 1 (Wellesley Coll. Ctr. for Research on Women,
Working Paper No. 189, 1988), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED335262.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/WQ53-3UVL]).
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6.	 I can turn on the television or open to the front page of the
paper and see people of my race widely represented.
7.	 When I am told about our national heritage or about 
“civilization,” I am shown that people of my color made it 
what it is. 
8.	 I can be sure that my children will be given curricular materials 
that testify to the existence of their race [at all levels of the
education continuum] . . . 
9.	 I can be pretty sure of having my voice heard in a group in
which I am the only member of my race.
10. I can be casual about whether or not to listen to another
person’s voice in a group in which they are the only member 
of their race. 
11. I can go into a music shop and count on finding the music 
of my race represented, into a supermarket and find the
staple foods, which fit with my cultural traditions, into a 
hairdresser’s shop and find someone who can cut my hair. 
12. Whether I use checks, credit cards, or cash, I can count on 
my skin color not to work against the appearance of financial 
reliability. 
13. I can arrange to protect my children most of the time from 
people who might not like them. 
14. I do not have to educate my children to be aware of [structural 
or institutional] racism for their own daily physical protection.
15. I can be pretty sure that my children’s teachers and employers
will tolerate them if they fit school and workplace norms;
my chief worries about them do not concern others’ attitudes 
toward their race. . . 
16. I can swear, or dress in second hand clothes, or not answer
letters, without having people attribute these choices to the
bad morals, the poverty or the illiteracy of my race.
17. I can speak in public to a powerful male group without
putting my race on trial. 
18. I can do well in a challenging situation without being called 
a [or thought of as] credit to my race.
19. I am never asked to speak for all the people of my racial 
group.
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20. I can remain oblivious of the language and customs of
persons of color who constitute the world’s majority without 
feeling in my culture any penalty for such oblivion. 
21. I can criticize our government and talk about how much I
fear its policies and behavior without being seen as a cultural 
outsider.
22. I can be pretty sure that if I ask to talk to the “person in charge,” 
I will be facing a person of my race.
23. If a traffic cop pulls me over or if the IRS audits my tax 
return, I can be sure I have not been singled out because of 
my race.
24. I can easily buy posters, post-cards, picture books, greeting 
cards, dolls, toys, and children’s magazines featuring people
of my race.
25. I can go home from most meetings of organizations I belong 
to feeling somewhat tied in, rather than isolated, out-of-place, 
outnumbered, unheard, held at a distance or feared. 
26. I can be pretty sure that an argument with a colleague of 
another race is more likely to jeopardize their chance for
advancement than to jeopardize mine. 
27. I can be pretty sure that if I argue for the promotion of a 
person of another race, or a program centering on race, this
is not likely to cost me heavily within my present setting, even 
if my colleagues disagree with me.
28. If I declare there is a racial issue at hand or there is not a
racial issue at hand, my race will lend me more credibility
for either position than a person of color will have. 
29. I can choose to ignore developments in minority writing and 
minority activist programs, or disparage them, or learn from
them, but in any case, I can find ways to be more or less 
protected from negative consequences of any of these choices. 
30. My culture gives me little fear about ignoring the perspectives 
and powers of people of other races.
31. I am not made acutely aware that my shape, bearing, or 
body odor will be taken as a reflection on my race.
32. I can worry [or talk] about racism without being seen as self-
interested or self-seeking[, or detrimentally impacting my
opportunities for advancement in a corporate setting].
33. I can take a job . . . without having my co-workers on the job 
suspect that I got it [only] because of my race.
34. If my day, week or year is going badly, I need not ask of each
negative episode or situation whether it had racial overtones. 
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35. I can be pretty sure of finding people who would be willing 
to talk with me and advise me about my next steps, 
professionally. 
36. I can think over many options, social, political, imaginative 
or professional, without asking whether a person of my race 
would be accepted or allowed to do what I want to do.
37. I can be late to a meeting without having the lateness reflect 
on my race. 
38. I can choose public accommodation without fearing that 
people of my race cannot get in or will be mistreated in the
places I have chosen. 
39. I can be sure that if I need legal or medical help, my race 
will not work against me.
40. I can arrange my activities so that I will never have to 
experience feelings of rejection owing to my race.
41. If I have low credibility as a leader, I can be sure that my
race is not the problem.
42. I can easily find academic courses and institutions which 
give attention only to people of my race.
43. I can expect figurative language and imagery in all of the
arts to testify to experiences of my race . . . 
44. I can travel alone or with my spouse without expecting 
embarrassment or hostility in those who deal with us. 
45. I have no difficulty finding neighborhoods where people 
approve of our household.
46. My children are given texts and classes, which implicitly
support our kind of family unit and do not turn them against
my choice of domestic partnership. 
47. I will feel welcomed and “normal” in the usual walks of public 
life, [both] institutional and social.35 
As a member of either the majority or minority, it is easy to forget these 
examples of white privilege because they are meant to be “elusive and 
fugitive,” easy to forget, because to acknowledge it means, “facing . . . the 
35. McIntosh, supra note 34, at 5–9, 16–17; Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege: 
Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack, CIRTL NETWORK, http://www.cirtl.net/files/PartI_ 
CreatingAwareness_WhitePrivilegeUnpackingtheInvisibleKnapsack.pdf (last visited Oct. 
15, 2015). 
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myth of meritocracy.”36  Ignoring the existence of white privilege, focusing 
instead on meritocracy, allows many to also ignore the reality of the 
pervasive racial inequities in our society.  White privilege is not having to 
entertain these considerations and relieves white people of the burden they
place on those that must consider them.




The language of the Court’s analysis in Brown explicitly uses context, 
specifically racial context, and emphasizes the necessity of considering it 
when interpreting the Constitution:
We must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public education. 
. . . We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its
present place in American life throughout the Nation.  Only in this way can it be
determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal 
protection of the laws.37 
Likewise, we must look to the effect of racial inequity in public education 
and consider the educational benefits of a diverse student body.  The
consideration of context remains valid and necessary today because, as 
the Brown Court recognized: 
[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments. . . . [I]t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to 
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must 
be made available to all on equal terms.38
 36. McIntosh, supra note 34, at 18; see also Nicholas Fitz, Economic Inequality: 
It’s Far Worse than You Think, SCI. AM. (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.scientificamerican.com/ 
article/economic-inequality-it-s-far-worse-than-you-think [http://perma.cc/94G2-K8TW] 
(“George Carlin joked that, ‘the reason they call it the American Dream is because you 
have to be asleep to believe it.’”).
37. 	  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954) (emphasis added). 
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental 
effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction
of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting
the inferiority of the negro group.  A sense of inferiority affects the motivation
of a child to learn.  Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to
retard the educational and mental development of Negro children and to deprive 
them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racially integrated school 
system.
Id. at 494 (quoting Findings of Fact of Judge Huxman, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 
797 (D. Kan. 1951) (No. T-316), http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/brownvboard/
brown huxman.html#FINDINGS_OF_FACT [http://perma.cc/Z3WB-CRSW]). 
38. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added). 
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Racial equity in and access to public educational opportunities should be 
a cornerstone of America’s education system.  We must not become stagnate, 
ignoring “those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement
but which make for greatness in” public education.39 
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of “separate but 
equal” has no place.  Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.
Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the 
actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived
of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.40 
Just as separate but equal educational facilities are abhorrent to our 
democratic ideals and the Constitution, so too is jurisprudence that would 
lead to or cause “separate but equal” or re-segregation in practice.  Brown
stands for the acknowledgement of structural and institutional racism, and
combatting the same.  Racial inequities in access to education, educational 
opportunities, and educational discipline are the modern day separate but 
equal in practice because the impact of these inequities essentially separates 
children—in access to quality education and application of educational 
opportunities and discipline—based on race.41  These racial inequities
lead to a sense of inferiority perpetuated by the media and some educators, 
and are heightened because they have the sanction of the law.42  Institutions
that do not reflect the diversity of our society subliminally bolster the idea 
that the unrepresented groups are inferior.43  This perceived, and in cases 
projected, inferiority affects the motivation to learn and tends to hinder 
the educational development of the unrepresented groups, and deprives 
them of the benefits they would receive in a diverse student population.44 
These benefits include: 
39. Id. (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950)). 
40. Id. at 495. 
41. Id. at 494. 
42. Id.
 43. Id.; see also Roy Brooks, Helping Minorities by Ending Affirmative Action?  A 
Review of Mismatch: How Affirmative Action Hurts Students It’s Intended To Help and
Why Universities Won’t Admit It, 6 GEO. J.  L. &  MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 69 (2014)
(book review) (criticizing the authors’ argument for ending affirmative action in undergraduate
colleges and law schools). 
44. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494; see also Brooks, supra note 43. 
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1.	 Increased perspectives that improve educational quality by
making classroom discussion “livelier, more spirited, and simply
more enlightening and interesting when the students have the 
greatest possible variety of backgrounds.”45 
2.	 Professionalism “because the skills students need for the 
‘increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through
exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and
viewpoints.’”46 
3.	 Civic engagement that fosters “[e]ffective participation by
members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civil life of our
Nation[, which] is essential if the dream of one Nation,
indivisible, is to be realized.”47 
What the Court does in Brown, but does not explicitly articulate, is
consider the context of structural—historical and cultural context: segregation, 
Jim Crow, slavery, and the psychological implications of “separate but 
equal”—and institutional—the realities of “separate but equal” public 
education facilities—racism; their impacts and effects on black children 
attending segregated schools.  In our modern environment, where 
information is available at our fingertips, it is incumbent on the Supreme 
Court to consider these realities in making its decisions regarding the 
consideration of race as a component of holistic diversity review in higher 
education admissions.48 
IV. FISHER AND CONNECTING DIVERSITY TO A COMPELLING 





Admittedly, looking at educational diversity through the context of
achieving racial equity does require taking an uncomfortable look and 
acknowledgement of structural racism, institutional racism, and white 
privilege. Yes, it will be uncomfortable, but it is a step we must take if
equal protection is to be applied equally to all. 
A. The Fisher Admissions Policy 
In Fisher v. the University of Texas at Austin, a white applicant alleged 
the University’s consideration of race and ethnicity in its admissions 
45. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 643 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S 306, 330 (2003)). 
46. Id. (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330). 
47. Id. (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332). 
48. See supra notes 9–36 and accompanying text. 
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process violated her Equal Protection rights.49  The University’s admission
policy consists of two main components: the Texas Top Ten Percent Law 
and holistic application review.  Under the Top Ten Percent Law, any student 
that graduates in the top 10% of their high school receives automatic 
admission to any public state college.50 
The holistic review process at issue in Fisher assigns each applicant two
numerical scores calculated by the applicants’ Academic Index (AI) and 
Personal Achievement Index (PAI).51  The standardized test scores, class 
rank, and high school classes of each applicant determine the AI.52 The 
PAI “measures a student’s leadership and work experience, awards,
extracurricular activities, community service, and other special circumstances 
that give insight into a student’s background.”53  The special circumstances
considered “included growing up in a single-parent home, speaking a 
language other than English at home, significant family responsibilities 
assumed by the applicant, and the general socioeconomic condition of the 
student’s family.”54 
The University calculates the PAI from the score received from two 
required essays55 and the personal achievement score based on the review 
of the applicant’s entire application file.56  The personal achievement score
receives slightly more weight than the essay scores and is calculated by:57 
[C]onduct[ing] a holistic review of the contents of the applicant’s entire file, 
including demonstrated leadership qualities, extracurricular activities, honors and
awards, essays, work experience, community service, and special circumstances, 
such as the applicant’s socioeconomic status, family composition, special family
responsibilities, the socioeconomic status of the applicant’s high school, and race. 
No numerical value is ever assigned to any of the components of personal 
achievement scores, and because race is a factor considered in the unique context 
of each applicant’s entire experience, it may be a beneficial factor for a minority 
or a non-minority student.58 
49.  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013). 
50. Fisher, 758 F.3d at 638, 654 (noting to qualify, applicants must attend high
schools that meet certain standards established by the law). 
51. Id. at 638. 
52. Id.
 53. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2415–16 (2013). 
54. Id. at 2416. 
55. Fisher, 758 F.3d at 638 (stating the essays receive a weighted average score). 
56. Id.
 57. Id.
 58. Id. (emphasis added). 
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The University does not assign a numerical score to race, although it is 
definitely a meaningful factor in the process.59  Once scores are assigned 
to the relevant applications, they are plotted on a grid and students are placed 
in cells based on their individual scores.  Students in cells above a certain
line are admitted; those below the line are not.60 
B. 	Justices Scalia and Thomas’ Fisher Concurrences: The Attack on 
Racial Considerations in Admissions Decisions 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia adheres to the view that racial 
discrimination is unconstitutional.  “The Constitution proscribes government 
discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided education is no 
exception.”61  It is important to note, although race is a “meaningful” factor 
of consideration, it was only one of multiple factors considered and,
therefore, does not constitute discrimination based on race—black students 
did not gain admission merely because they were black; neither were white
students rejected merely because they were white.  Under the University’s 
admission policy, race could be a positive factor for both white and black
students.62  Justice Scalia also insinuates he would not support the finding 
that the educational benefits of diversity can justify racial preferences in
university admissions and are thus not a compelling government interest.63 
To admit applicants through this holistic review, the admissions office generates 
an initial AI/PAI matrix for each academic program, wherein applicants are placed 
into groups that share the same combination of AI and PAI scores. School 
liaisons then draw stair-step lines along this matrix, selecting groups of students
on the basis of their combined AI and PAI scores.  This process is repeated until 
each program admits a sufficient number of students. 
Fisher’s AI scores were too low for admission to her preferred academic 
programs at UT Austin; Fisher had a Liberal Arts AI of 3.1 and a Business AI 
of 3.1.  And, because nearly all the seats in the undeclared major program in Liberal
Arts were filled with Top Ten Percent students, all holistic review applicants
“were only eligible for Summer Freshman Class or CAP [Coordinated Admissions
Program] admission, unless their AI exceeded 3.5.  Accordingly, even if she had 
received a perfect PAI score of 6, she could not have received an offer of
admission to the Fall 2008 freshman class.  If she had been a minority, the result
would have been the same. 
Id. at 638–39. 
59. Id. at 638. 
60. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415, 2416–17 (2013).(“Each 
college—such as Liberal Arts or Engineering—admits students separately.  So a student is
considered initially for her first-choice college, then for her second choice, and finally for
general admission as an undeclared major.”). 
61. Id. at 2422 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 
349 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
62. Fisher, 758 F.3d at 638. 
63. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2411 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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In section II of his concurrence, Justice Thomas concludes, “I would 
overrule Grutter and hold that the University’s admissions program violates 
the Equal Protection Clause because the University has not put forward a
compelling interest that could possibly justify racial discrimination”64 because
the equal protection principle reflects his opinion that racial classifications 
destructively impact our society and individuals.65  He further contends,
“[t]he Constitution abhors classifications based on race” because “every
time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race
relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.”66  This
phrase is steeped in the myth of meritocracy and simply ignores the realities
of racial inequity in public institutions, including public education. Race
should be a relevant consideration in the provision of burdens and benefits 
because racial equity has not been achieved in this country.  The consideration
of race to achieve racial equity should not “demean us all” because this 
nation was, and continues to be, built on racial inequity.  As a result, remedying 
racial inequities should not demean our national conscious; it should dignify 
it. 
Justice Thomas further decries Grutter because the compelling government 
interest advanced—the educational benefits of diversity—did not concern 
remedying past discrimination.67  Citing Justice Scalia’s concurrence in 
Croson, Justice Thomas argues, “there is nothing ‘pressing’ or ‘necessary’
about obtaining whatever educational benefits may flow from racial 
diversity.”68  I agree with Justice Thomas that the interest advanced does 
not concern remedying past discrimination; however, eradicating racial
inequities does, and its eradication is necessary and pressing.  As such, 
achieving racial equity is a compelling government interest; holistic
diversity review in admissions is a method to achieve the interest; and the 
educational benefits of a diverse student body are a positive outcome of 
striving to attain the compelling government interest of racial equity. 
64. Id. at 2429 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
65. Id. at 2422 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Penã,
515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). 
66. Id. (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 353 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part)). 
67. Id. at 2423–24 (interpreting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328). 
68. Id. at 2424 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 356 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part)); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520–21, 525 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 929 





















V. A WAY FORWARD: THE VALUE PROPOSITION FOR THE 

CONSIDERATION OF RACE IN PUBLIC EDUCATION
 
When responding to the viewpoints and arguments of Justices Scalia 
and Thomas, it is necessary to view diversity through the lens of achieving 
racial equity—a genuinely non-racist society where the “distribution of 
society’s benefits and burdens would not be skewed by race.”69  The holistic 
review of diversity admissions, including those that consider race, is a 
form of inclusion, not exclusion or racial discrimination, as Justice Thomas 
would have us believe.  Nor does it operate to provide racial preference, as
Justice Scalia suggests.  Simply stated, a holistic approach, by its very nature,
considers the whole individual, attempts to obtain a “critical mass”
representing all types diversity, and is a necessary step in the direction of
obtaining racial equity in public education.  The segregation Justice Thomas 
attempts to analogize to considering diversity in admissions processes 
excluded individuals solely on the basis of race/ethnicity and is therefore 
distinguishable from holistic diversity, which considers race as one of 
many factors in the decision-making process.
It is important to make this distinction because although Justice Thomas 
asserts the arguments in favor of holistic diversity review are the same or
similar to those made by segregationists, the underlying purposes, and
results are in complete contradiction to each other.  Segregationists wanted 
and, in fact, supported outright racial discrimination and separation.
Whereas proponents of educational diversity seek to attain a well-rounded 
student body, reflecting the diversity of our society, and the benefits flowing
from that diversity, as well as equitable access to educational opportunities
for all members of society.  Considering the diversity of a candidate does 
not constitute discrimination because it is not selecting—or excluding— 
the candidate solely based on race.  When race/ethnicity is one consideration 
of many, then all are treated equally under the law, so long as race/ethnicity 
does not become the single, determinative factor.  For example, when making 
decisions on the admission of two identical candidates, the only difference 
being the race of the student, then the university should consider the
students as individuals within the context of its entire class of admitted
applicants—looking to fill the gaps in “diversity” that are not exclusively 
racial or ethnic in origin, or admit both applicants. 
Justice Thomas urges us to believe, “[there] is no principled distinction 
between the University’s assertion that diversity yields educational benefits 
and the segregationists’ assertion that segregation yielded those same
benefits.”70  But there is a “principled distinction” when both are viewed 
69.  Structural Racism Glossary, supra note 9.
 70. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2428 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
930 
KIEL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/18/2015 9:53 AM 
  
 





[VOL. 52:  913, 2015] Racial Equity in Public Institutions
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
through the lens of racial equity, including the consideration of structural 
and institutional racism, and white privilege: diversity reflects the composition 
of our society; segregation does not, it shuts the door to access. 
A. Overcoming the Equal Protection Argument:       

A Guide to Implementation 

Affirmative action and quotas are violative of the equal protection of 
those citizens that do not benefit from the quota; however, holistic review 
of an individual’s many characteristics, including the consideration of 
race/ethnicity, do not violate those protections.  When adopting or enforcing 
a holistic diversity review policy, universities should consider race as one 
of many aspects of the individual student’s potential for positive 
contributions to the educational community, but must ensure race is not 
the single, determining factor for admission.  The university’s policy in
Fisher is a good model.  To ensure compliance with equal protection, 
universities should institute a holistic approach by reviewing an applicant’s 
entire file, including, but not limited to: 
x Standardized test scores 
x Class rank 
x Demonstrated leadership qualities 
x Classes taken 
x Writing samples 
x Extracurricular activities 
x Honors and awards 
x Work experience 
x Community service 
x Socioeconomic status 
x Family/household composition 
x Special family responsibilities 
x Socioeconomic status of the applicant’s high school 
x Language(s) spoken in the home 
x Ethnicity 
x Race71 
It is not racial discrimination to consider the whole person—including 
that person’s race.  This broad review is not racial discrimination because 
71. See id. at 2415–16. 
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neither race nor ethnicity are the determinative factor, and the race or
ethnicity of majority and minority candidates would be considered to obtain 
the benefits of a diverse student body. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Racial equity is vital to this nation because without it the principles that 
are the hallmark and foundation of our democracy are hollow and incurably 
flawed. Until there are no disparities—access to education, treatment of 
racial minorities in educational institutions, and access to educational
opportunities—the consideration of race in public education admissions
policies will remain a compelling government interest necessary to ensure/ 
move toward the standard of racial equity in public institutions—educational
institutions are just a beginning. 
The judiciary in isolation is not enough; we the people must also ensure 
the record reflects the context necessary to establish a solid case for racial
equity as a compelling government interest. As suggested by previous 
scholars on the topic, we must also pursue other mechanisms—legislative,
policy, activism—to realize racial equity in our institutions of public 
education.
Regardless of the Court’s perceived hostility, obtaining racial equity is
a compelling government interest consistent with the principles of equal 
protection.  Holistic diversity review is the current mechanism to achieve— 
or at least move toward achieving—this compelling interest while 
simultaneously ensuring all receive equal treatment under the law.
Ignoring the absence of racial equity in our public institutions, including 
those of higher education, is not the way forward.  As a nation we must open 
our eyes, confront our past and present, and work toward the racial equity
that continues to elude us; we must acknowledge and repair the chronic 
racial inequities in our country.  Only then will we begin the journey to a 
wholly racially equitable society. 
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